

THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Council

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NOTE FOR: Kenneth Glozer, OMB

1. Attached is a possible restatement of the questions under Task 6, International Material Supply, and 9, Political Reliability. It has been cleared with [redacted] and his people. My objectives are two-fold: (1) to identify questions that both can and need to be answered; and (2) to clearly show how Tasks 6 and 9 relate to each other.

2. I would appreciate your comments. Please keep me informed on the next steps you have in mind for the interagency process.


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Attachment

25X1

Task 6

International Materials Supply

Estimate normal and potential wartime (under the assumed scenarios) supplies to the US for the 12-15 most important stockpile commodities originating in countries not under Soviet military control or in a war zone. The estimates would include the following steps.

A. Identify, by commodity and producer, the normal peacetime exports to the US, allied powers, communist countries, and other countries.

B. Estimate, by commodity and producer, the likely investment and import requirements to: (1) Maintain production at prewar rates; and (2) Increase capacity and production by 25%. Also estimate how quickly capacity and production would fall if imported materials and equipment were unavailable.

C. Estimate wartime demand for each commodity in allied countries, taking into account the physical disruption due to the war, mobilization needs, and shipping constraints.

D. Estimate the likely net demand for each commodity to third countries, taking into account wartime conditions.

E. From the above data and estimates, estimate the supply of each major commodity that could be potentially available to the US in the specified war scenario.

Task 9

Political Reliability

Estimate the probabilities that the supplies of major stockpile commodities potentially available to the US estimated in Task 6 actually would be available, given problems of political stability and physical security. The estimates would address the following questions for each of the 20-25 non-European producers of these commodities.

A. How likely is it that the government of source country would wish to withhold the commodities from the US? Consider both its financial needs and political orientation.

B. How likely is it that civil unrest, sabotage, insurgency, or other military action, whether or not Soviet-inspired, would disrupt production or exports of the commodities?

C. How likely is it that contingencies listed under A and B above would cause land transport routes through non-producers of major commodities to be interrupted?

D. Considering the above risks, how reliable would the potential supply of stockpile commodities from each country be to the US?